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I. INTRODUCTION
Alexis de Tocqueville, the great social observer and political scientist,
arrived in the United States in 183 1,1 only three years after Andrew Jackson,
the populist former military Governor of Florida, was elected President of
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1. I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERUCA (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A.
Knopf 1945) at epilogue (1835).
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the United States.2  Tocqueville found a nation of people "seeking with
almost equal eagerness material wealth and moral satisfaction; heaven in the
world beyond, and well-being and liberty in this one." 3 This was the nature
of the people who only a few years later adopted Florida's first constitution.4
Floridians today still seek those things our predecessors pursued with such
vigor: freedom of conscience, financial security, and liberty.
In an effort to assure the continued protection of these values, the
framers of the 1838 Florida Constitution included a strong entreaty to those
who read it a century and a half later. They noted that "frequent recurrence
to fundamental principles, is absolutely necessary, to preserve the blessings
of liberty."5 Like the framers of other state constitutions, the framers of
Florida's original constitution understood that over time all human
institutions, including constitutions, are subject to potentially harmful
changes, misunderstandings, and misinterpretations. They believed that it
was necessary to periodically revisit the reasons for creating a constitution in
order to assure its continued vitality.6  As Florida pursues the task of
2. See ALLEN MORRIs, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1995-1996, at 323 (1994). After he
became President of the United States, Jackson continued to directly influence the philosophy
of government in Florida through, among other things, the placement of his friends as state
officers. Id. at 324-27. For example, Jackson played a prominent role in advancing the
political careers of all five of the men who served as Territorial Governors of Florida. Id.
William Pope DuVal, the first territorial Governor of Florida, was reappointed to that office
by Jackson, and Florida's second Territorial Governor, John Henry Eaton, was a prominent
member of Jackson's Cabinet. Id. at 324. Territorial Governor Richard Keith Call was a
soldier under Jackson and was a close enough friend to have been married in Jackson's home.
Id. at 325-26. Florida's fourth Territorial Governor, Robert Raymond Reid, who was serving
as Territorial Governor when the Florida Constitution of 1838 was created, got his start in
Florida politics when President Jackson appointed him United States Judge of East Florida.
MORRIS, supra at 326. Even Florida's sixth Territorial Governor, John Branch, who did not
take office until 1844, had previously served as Jackson's Secretary of the Navy. Id. at 327.
3. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 45.
4. Tocqueville's arrival in this country in 1831 preceded the drafting of Florida's first
constitution by only seven years. Id. at epilogue. See generally FLA. CONST. of 1838.
5. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I § 26. This provision was adopted directly from language
contained in article I, § 15 of the Virginia Constitution. George Mason has been credited with
authoring the original provision. See Brian Snure, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental
Principles: Individual Rights, Free Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67
WASH. L. Rnv. 669, 676 (1992). Different versions were subsequently incorporated into the
constitutions of at least 11 different states. See Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of
Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1803, 1811 (1992). See also Snure, supra, at 676
nn.50-54.
6. With regard to a similar "frequent recurrence" provision in the North Carolina
Constitution, Bilionis quotes William Hooper, a North Carolina delegate to the Continental
[Vol. 22:391
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considering revisions to its constitution, this article is intended to discuss the
fundamental principles that led to the creation of the Florida Constitution. It
also discusses some of the major features of the Florida Constitution and
suggests that its provisions should be examined from a functional
perspective to determine whether they adequately serve appropriate
constitutional purposes.
II. LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS REVISION COMMISSIONS
The only previous Constitution Revision Commission that has met
pursuant to article XI of the Florida Constitution convened in 1978. While
the 1978 Commission did not produce amendments acceptable to the public,
its review of the constitution was still of some value.8  The 1978
Commission raised public consciousness with regard to the role of our
constitution and its contents. 9 By proposing certain amendments, it also
brought particular issues to the forefront of the state's public policy agenda
Congress in Philadelphia, as having said: "'[i]t is necessary that recurrence should often be
had to original principles to prevent those evils which in a course of years must creep in and
vitiate every human institution and by insensible gradations at length steal upon the
Understanding as part of the original system."' Bilionis, supra note 5, at 1811 n. 27 (quoting
10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 862, 867 (William L. Saunders ed., Raleigh,
N.C., J. Daniels, 1890)). Mr. Hooper seems to have believed that returning to fundamental
principles would involve some weeding out of inappropriate provisions that had crept into the
constitution over the years. Id. In a similar vein, shortly after the 1838 Florida Constitution
was adopted, President William Henry Harrison said:
The spirit of liberty is the sovereign balm for every injury which our
institutions may receive. On the contrary, no care that can be used in the
construction of our Government, no division of powers, no distribution of
checks in its several departments, will prove effectual to keep us a free people
if this spirit is suffered to decay; and decay it will without constant nurture.
Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States (1989), William Henry Harrison:
Inaugural Address (visited July 7, 1997) <http://www.cc.columbia.edu/acis/bartleby/
inaugura/pres26.html>.
7. See TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REERENCE GUIDE
15 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1991).
8. While the public rejected the 1978 Commission's proposals, it later rejected a
proposed amendment that would have abolished the Constitution Revision Commission. Id.
See also HJR 50 (1979) (amending article XI, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, to
eliminate the Constitution Revision Commission).
9. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 15-16.
1997]
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where they would remain for many years to come.'0 If the current revision
process produces similar results, it will have served a useful purpose.
The 1965 Constitution Revision Commission, which created our current
constitution, the Constitution of 1968, was formed through a different
process than either the 1978 Commission or the current 1997-98
Commission. 11  The 1965 Commission also differed from the 1978
Commission in that it did not pursue changes in public policy as a primary
objective. Perhaps for that reason, the 1965 Commission was the more
successful of the two.
12
Those involved in the revision process of the mid-1960s had a general
understanding that "the rightful place of the states in the federal system had
been overwhelmed by central federal power."'13  The Commission that
produced the Florida Constitution of 1968 sought to address that concern. It
also focused on eliminating extraneous provisions thereby returning the
constitution to its fundamental purposes. The Commission succeeded in
substantially reducing the size of the Florida Constitution 5 and in
eliminating "much of the obsolete and redundant language."'
6
10. See iL (discussing a number of amendments originally proposed by the 1978
Commission that were rejected by the public, only to later be approved upon submission to the
voters by the Legislature). Even so, the 1978 Commission might have been more successful if
it had focused more on fundamentals and less on discussing sweeping changes in public
policy.
11. See id. at 11-15. The 1965 Commission was created by the Legislature; the 1978
and 1997-98 Revision Commissions resulted from a recommendation made by the 1965
Commission that was adopted into the Florida Constitution of 1968. See id. at 15-16. While
the proposed amendments produced by the 1978 Commission were submitted directly to the
voters, the proposed amendments produced by the Commission of 1965 were submitted to the
Legislature. The Legislature then substantially revised the proposals during four special
sessions. The end product of those efforts was our current constitution, the Florida
Constitution of 1968. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 680.
12. See generally D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 14 (discussing the results achieved by
the 1965 and 1978 revision commissions). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, many other
factors contributed to a favorable climate for changes in public policy and in the state
constitution. The public was grappling with the civil rights movement, political issues
involving elections and voting rights, military matters relating to the Vietnam War, and
criminal law issues such as search and seizure and the death penalty. Many of these issues
rose to a level of federal constitutional significance and the public interest in constitutional
law was considerably heightened. By 1978, public concern over many of these issues was less
intense.
13. See id. at 11.
14. See id. at 13.
15. See id. at 12. Frequent statements to the effect that the 1968 revision reduced the
size of the Florida Constitution by half are somewhat misleading. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra
[Vol. 22:391
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Perhaps the current Constitution Revision Commission would be wise
to pursue these same objectives on a more modest scale. The Florida
Constitution continues to serve as a vehicle for some "largely meaningless
but politically popular verbiage. ' 17 Accordingly, there are still opportunities
for positive improvements to the constitution by pursuing the reductionist
course that began with the creation of the 1968 Constitution.18
Because the Florida Constitution has a strong foundation and generally
serves the people well, wholesale revision is probably not advisable.' 9
Nonetheless, the revision process offers us, as a society, an opportunity to
review the reasons why we have a constitution and to -consider whether
specific provisions of our constitution are serving their intended purposes.
That review may, after all, reveal ways in which the constitution can be
improved. To the extent that revision is necessary at all, the objective in
revising or amending the constitution should be to adjust the constitution's
contents back to its basic purposes, thereby restoring its power to inspire the
people and the government.
note 7, at 12. In fact, substantial portions of the Florida Constitution of 1885 were kept in
force by including them in history notes and incorporating them by reference into the 1968
Constitution. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) (incorporating by reference the Dade
County Home Rule provisions of the Constitution of 1885). The 1997-98 Revision
Commission should consider advancing the reductionist intent of the 1968 Commission by
proposing amendments that would eliminate the need for these extensive and unwieldy
historical notes.
16. D'ALMBERTE, supra note 7, at 13.
17. Id at 16. -
18. See id at 12 (discussing reductions in the Florida Constitution of 1968).
19. The need for stability in the social order and in the law demands that a constitution
be changed infrequently and no more than is necessary to accomplish particular purposes. It
has been noted that "stability in constitutional law promotes the formation and maintenance of
a social consensus on basic values. It does so by encouraging [legislators] and courts to
articulate basic values and to provide moral leadership for society." Michael G. Colantuono,
The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and
Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1509 (1987). Because it has the "potential to
promote a consensus on social valuesi,]" stability in constitutional law "contributes to social
cooperation and peace." Id at 1510. Tocqueville noted with some dismay that "[a]lmost all
the American constitutions have been amended within thirty years." I TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 1, at 267. He found that "the circumstances which contribute most powerfully to
democratic instability, and which admit of the free application of caprice to the most important
objects, are here in full operation." I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 267.
19971
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III. INFLUENCES, ORIGINS, AND PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FLORIDA'S
CONSTITUTION
No revision of the Florida Constitution should be undertaken without
first attempting to understand its nature and the purposes it serves. That
understanding must come primarily from an examination of the history of
constitutional government. Reviewing history will also provide some
perspective with regard to the things that a constitution can and cannot
accomplish. 1
In reviewing our history, it is not difficult to see the effects of
constitutional law. As Tocquevile said: "America is the only country in
which it has been possible to witness the natural and tranquil growth of
society, and where the influence exercised on the future condition of states
by their origin is clearly distinguishable."2 Having achieved a reasonable
level of success at self-government, Floridians should not ignore the
principles that contributed to that success.
A. Early Constitional Theory and Practice
The seeds of modem constitutions can be found in documents as old as
23the Magna Carta. However, it was in the latter part of the eighteenth
20. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open
Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REv. 1279, 1282 (1995) (noting that
"principled debate over a constitutional provision's application to contemporary
circumstances can begin only after grappling with its historical antecedents"). This does not
imply that we are forever bound by "original intent" or to the current contents of the
constitution. The people are free to amend the constitution at any time. See discussion infra
note 78 (discussing the different methods by which the Florida Constitution can be amended).
21. Like James Madison, we must support our constitution "as well in its limitations as
in its authorities." Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States (1989), James
Madison: First Inaugural Address (visited July 7, 1997)
http://www.ce.columbiaedu/acis/bartleby/inauuural/presl 8.html.
22. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 28. While he admired the system of government
and the people of this country, Tocqueville did not always like what he found here. He
abhorred the institution of slavery and his thoughts about slavery caused him to express his
admiration for our social system with some reservations. For example, he commented: "I am
far from supposing that the American laws are pre-eminently good in themselves: I do not
hold them to be applicable to all democratic nations; and several of them seem to me to be
dangerous, even in the United States." Id. at 322.
23. Indeed, the origin of at least one provision of the Florida Constitution, the guarantee
of "access to courts" contained in article I, § 21, has been traced directly to a similar provision
in the Magna Carta. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 32. As Professor Robert Williams
[Vol. 22:391
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century that Europeans began to fully articulate the key elements of
constitutional theory, such that they could be harmonized into a body of
law.24 A common understanding developed that when individuals came
together to form governments, they had certain inherent rights that must
survive the creation of government.25 These rights could be apprehended
through an understanding of morality,26 reason, and logic, and they could not
be divested. 7  Indeed, governmental infringements of fundamental
individual liberties were seen as the potential source for a multitude of
threatening conditions. 28 Government had come to be seen as a consensualcreation of those who sought to be governed.29 It was considered that
commented to the organizational session of the 1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission:
"[T]he roots of this Commission reach deeply into history.... ." JOURNAL OF THE 1997-1998
CoNsTrrUON REVISION COMMISSION 14, 15 (June 17, 1997) (remarks by Robert F Williams).
While the United States Constitution has no "access to courts" provision, a provision similar
to the one in the Florida Constitution can be found in the constitutions of 39 states. See
Hoffman, supra note 20, at 1279 (citing David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 1197,1201 &n.25 (1992)).
24. See, e.g., Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP.
L. REv. 989, 990 (1996) (discussing the contributions of philosophers Charles Montesquieu,
Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, and common law scholars Edward Coke, Henry
deBracton, and William Blackstone to the formation of early constitutions).
25. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 54 (Thomas P. Pearson
ed., 1952) (1690).
26. Tocqueville simultaneously explained the moral foundation of American law and
distinguished it from the recently demised French aristocracy: "To the European, a public
officer represents a superior force; to an American, he represents a right. In America, then, it
may be said that no one renders obedience to man, but to justice and to law." I TOCQUEViLLE,
supra note 1, at 98.
27. See id. at 81-82; see also VA. CONST. art. I, § I (stating that "all men.., have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity").
28. Interference with any one individual's inherent right to freedom of conscience, for
example, poses a threat to the rights of all individuals in the society. This in turn poses a
threat to the society itself. Carried to the extreme, deprivation of liberty can threaten a
government's continued existence. See, e.g., DANIEL WEBSTER, The Reply to Hayne, in THE
GREAT SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 227, 256 (Edwin P. Whipple ed., Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1993) (1870) (explaining that "the people may... throw off any government
when it becomes oppressive and intlerable...").
29. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 54 ("men being, as has been said, by nature all free,
equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political
power of another without his own consent'). See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just [P]owers
from the [C]onsent of the [G]overned....").
1997]
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people, as the creators of government, held all political power .30 They could
bestow power on political figures, or withhold power and reserve it for
individuals in society as the people deemed appropriate.
Notwithstanding the significance of revolutionary thinking, the
translation of constitutional theory into practice did not result from the
peaceful contemplation of scholars. Government is believed to have arisen
from the desire to fully exploit freedom32 and the necessity of securing self-
protection against others. "Constitutional government," however, arose
much more recently to provide people with protection against other forms of
government. As we approach the revision process, we must remember that
constitutions resulted from governmental oppression.34  Oppressive
government turned the public mind away from obedience to the laws of
kings and toward the laws of reason. Our first responsibility is to assure
that our constitution continues to protect against tyranny.
B. Constitutional Developments in the States
For practical reasons, constitutional theory could not immediately be
put into full practice in Europe. Perhaps because there was a less existing
government to supplant, and the tyrannical monarchies were more remote,
30. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1. While the principle espoused in article I, section 1,
predates any constitution, the language of this provision was undoubtedly adopted from one of
the earlier constitutions of the other states where similar provisions abounded. See, e.g., VA.
CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
3 1. See Holland, supra note 24, at 993 (noting that "[t]he people possessing this plenary
bundle of specific powers were free to confer them on different governments and different
branches of the same government as they deemed best."). Europeans had this discovery thrust
upon them by the French and American revolutions.
32. As previously noted, constitutional law is predicated upon belief that all individuals
possess certain rights which cannot be divested by government. See I TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 1, at 56. People join together under the umbrella of government so that they may better
enjoy those rights. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 54-55.
33. Locke speculated that primitive cultures had no need of constitutional law until
someone among them rose to a position of tyranny. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 124. Mill
proposed that the only justifications for government interference with individual freedom were
"self- protection" and to "prevent harm to others." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13
(Currin V. Shields ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1956) (1859).
34. It was the imposition of government against their will that caused people to develop
systems of self-governance for their own protection. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 114.
35. See id.
36. See Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States
Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REv. 891, 892 (1990) (noting that the colonists were
"[p]olitically... far removed from England" ... and "used to a significant measure of self-
[Vol. 22:391398
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the principles of free self-governance found more fertile soil on this
continent.
As Tocqueville noted:
The general principles which are the groundwork of modem
constitutions, principles which, in the seventeenth century, were
imperfectly known in Europe, and not completely triumphant even
in Great Britain, were all recognized and established by the laws of
New England: the intervention of the people in public affairs, the
free voting of taxes, the responsibility of the agents of power,
personal liberty, and trial by jury were all positively established
without discussion.
37
Because of continued oppression, the founders of our national
government ultimately declared and sustained independence for the thirteen
individual colonies that then existed.38 However, it was eleven years later, in
1787, before the states joined together under the common bond of a single
national constitution. 39 Before the Federal Constitution was adopted, all of
government"). Notwithstanding ultimate English oversight, "colonial Legislatures
substantially enacted most laws and adopted policies for the colonies." See id.
37. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 41.
38. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). This document
begins:
We hold these [T]ruths to be self-evident, that all [Mien are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure
these [R]ights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
[Plowers from the [C]onsent of the [G]ovemed.
Id.
39. See Clinton, supra note 36, at 891. For the first five years of independence, there
was no national document to bind the colonies together. Id. In 1781, the original colonies
agreed to adopt the Articles of Confederation which, in reality, operated more like a treaty
between the states than a constitution. Id. at 891 n.1. However, many of the states specifically
conditioned their ratification of the Constitution on the ultimate adoption of a bill of rights by
Congress. See id at 911-12. Because of the inadequacies in the Articles of Confederation,
the states reconvened in a second constitutional congress in 1787 which ultimately led to the
adoption of the current United States Constitution in 1789. See generally id at 891.Others
feared that enumerating certain rights would lead to the conclusion that others did not exist.
To allay those fears, Congress also adopted the Ninth Amendment which provides that "'[tihe
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people."' Clinton, supra note 36, at 911-12 (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. IX). Still others feared that an enumeration of rights in a Federal Constitution might
somehow be construed to supplant the states as the primary guarantors of individual liberties.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 at 510-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
19971
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the thirteen states had adopted state constitutions.40 Tocqueville noted that
"[t]he form of the Federal government of the United States was the last to be
adopted; and it is in fact nothing more than a summary of those republican
principles which were current in the whole community before it existed, and
independently of its existence.'Al
The state constitutions were entirely unique in the history of
government.42 In addition to the fundamental proposition that all political
power is derived from the people, the state constitutions recognized, and for
the first time resolved, certain problems inherent in the very idea of
government-problems that could threaten the continued existence of self-
government if left uncontrolled.
First, the states recognized that consolidations of power are dangerous
to the public interest.43 Having escaped one king, the people of the thirteen
(discussing the reasons why the Constitution did not contain a bill of rights). To resolve this
concern and others, a Tenth Amendment was adopted which provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
40. See Holland, supra note 24, at 990. In response to a resolution passed by the
Continental Congress in May of 1776, and the signing of the Declaration of Independence, all
of the former colonies established new constitutional governments, and eight had drafted new
constitutions before the end of that year. See id. at 989-90.
41. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 61; see also Holland, supra note 24, at 991-92
(noting that the framers of the United States Constitution had participated in writing and had
lived under 18 state constitutions before they began their work on the Federal Constitution);
James G. Exum, Jr., Rediscovering State Constitutions, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1741, 1741-42 (1992)
(noting that the framers of the Federal Constitution "drew heavily on the experience of
delegates to state constitutional conventions"). Indeed, the foundation for the federal
Constitution was the so-called "Virginia Plan" presented to the Second Continental Congress
on May 29, 1878, as an alternative to amending the Articles of Confederation. See Clinton,
supra note 36, at 898. It incorporated a governmental structure that already existed in many
of the states, which was based on the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, and others. See id. at
911. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (comparing provisions of many
state constitutions with those of the new Federal Constitution).
42. See Holland, supra note 24, at 992 (noting that dividing sovereign power was a
novel idea).
43. Without regard to the form of government (or organization) being discussed, there is
a tendency for power to consolidate or centralize over time in the hands of a single individual
or just a few individuals. While all of the early state constitutions guarded against
consolidation of power in the hands of government officials, it was years later before any steps
were taken to curb corporate power. Pennsylvania considered adopting a provision into its
first constitution that provided "'[t]hat an enormous Proportion of Property vested in a few
individuals is dangerous to the Rights, and destructive of the Common Happiness of Mankind;
and therefore every free State hath a Right by its Laws to discourage the Possession of such
Property."' Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade:
[Vol. 22:391
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colonies were not anxious to find themselves under the control of another.
44
The consolidation and centralization of power outside the hands of the
people to be governed is the essence of tyranny and was the first problem the
framers of state constitutions had to overcome.45 They attacked this problem
in three ways: 1) by distributing the key powers of government among
three different branches, each having some power to control the other two;
2) by further distributing the powers given to government among numerous
offices, thereby liniting any one office's ability to exercise unrestrained
power over the people;4 and 3) by creating constitutions that passed only a
Pennsylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and its Influences on American Constitutionalism,
62 TEMP. L. REv. 541, 557 (1989) (quoting ERc FONER, TOM PAiNE AND REVOLUTIONARY
AmERiCA 133 (1976)). However, that proposal was rejected. It was during the Jacksonian era
that states began to introduce constitutional restrictions on the powers of corporations and
banks like those found in the 1838 Florida Constitution, which provided "[tihat perpetuities
and monopolies, are contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be allowed." FLA.
CONsT. of 1838 art. I, § 24 (1838). Even stronger more detailed restrictions on corporate
power and influence were adopted into state constitutions during the late 1800s, immediately
prior to and after the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1994). See,
e.g., Snure, supra note 5, at 672-73, 682 (discussing numerous specific restrictions on
monopoly power that were included in the state of Washington's Constitution of 1889).
Avoiding concentrations of power continues to be one of the primary purposes of
constitutional law, the decisions of which continually assert that "rights protection cannot be
entrusted to a monopoly guardian." John Kincaid, Foreward The New Federalism Context
of the New Judicial Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 944 (1995).
44. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 24, at 991 (explaining that the newly independent
states were fearfiul of any "central government, particularly one with substantial powers").
45. It was theoretically possible for people to join together and voluntarily place all
political power in the hands of a single individual, or small group of individuals. "[Tihe
United States Constitution does not require a state to separate the exercise of its own
sovereign power horizontally: among an executive, a Legislature, and ajudiciary." Id. at 995
(emphasis added). It is possible, for example, for a state to create a democratic monarchy in
which the people elect a queen and pass all of their powers over to her. However, the framers
of the state constitutions universally chose not to follow that model. To do so would have
been inconsistent with their heritage. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at xix-xxii (discussing
Locke's thought that absolute monarchy is "inconsistent with civil society").
46. The key powers of government include the power to make laws, the power to
execute the laws, and the power to pass judgment on the laws. -See generally, LOCKE, supra
note 25. Article 11 of each of the Florida Constitutions since the Constitution of 1838 has
explicitly provided for the separation of these powers. See FLA. CONST. of 1838 art. If (1839);
FLA. CO NST. of 1861 art. 11 (1861), FLA. CONST. of 1865 art. 11 (1865); FLA. CONST. of 1868
art. 11 (1868); FLA. CoNsT. of 1885 art. If (1885); FLA CONST. art. II, § 3 (1968).
47. For example, the powers of judges are limited in numerous ways. They have no
power to take action at all until some party properly invokes their jurisdiction, which is limited
by the constitution and by general law. See FLA. CONST. art. V (establishing certain courts and
the boundaries of their jurisdiction, directing the Legislature to establish still other courts, and
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portion of the peoples' inherent powers to the states, reserving certain
powers to individuals in the form of rights.48 Some, but not all, of these
49
rights were enumerated in the state constitutions. Ultimately, the addition
of a national constitution was intended to add another layer of protection
against the exercise of tyrannical power.5°
The framers of the state constitutions also recognized that by placing
the power to make governmental decisions in the hands of a majority of the
people, the remaining "political minorities" might suffer injustices. 1 As a
practical matter, it was also unwieldy to expect all individuals to share in
every decision by voting. Thus, to protect against "the tyranny of the
majority, ', 52 and to aid the practical administration of government, the states
authorizing the Legislature to take certain actions with regard to the courts and their
jurisdiction). The decisions of trial judges are normally subject to appeal by disappointed
litigants, and the power of appellate judges is limited to ruling on cases appealed from lower
courts. See id. at §§ 3-5. Appellate judges also normally sit in panels and in order to rule they
must secure the agreement of a majority of the other judges sitting on a panel with them. See
also FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 3(a) (mandating that of the seven justices of the supreme court, five
constitute a quorum and the concurrence of four justices is necessary for a decision); FLA.
CONST. artV, § 4(a) (providing that in each district court of appeal, three judges consider each
case and the concurrence of two is necessary for a decision). See, e.g., FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN.
2.030(a)(1) (establishing panel, quorum, and majority vote requirements for the Supreme
Court of Florida). Similarly, no individual can exercise the power to make laws. Lawmakers
must secure the agreement of a majority of the other legislators who sit in the Legislature with
them before they can exercise any power at all. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
48. The constitutions of all 50 states contain a declaration of rights, bill of rights, or
some other enumeration of individual rights.
49. Article I, section 1 of the Florida Constitution contains an "unenumerated rights
lause" similar to the one found in the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Most other state constitutions contain similar provisions. See generally Louis Karl Bonham,
Unenumerated Rights Clauses in State Constitutions, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (1985).
50. As James Madison said: "[A] double security arises to the rights of the people
[because] [t]he different governments will control each other ... ." TIM FEDERALIST No. 51 at
323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
51. The term "political minorities" must be distinguished from the currently popular
usage of the word "minorities." A group of people in disagreement with the majority on any
issue is a political minority group. A political minority, or majority, can be widely diverse in
all other respects so long as its members share a common view on some political issue. The
greatest strength-and weakness-of a properly functioning democracy is that while the
composition of the political majority shifts and changes as frequently as the issues being
considered, most of the people are in the political majority most of the time. The result is, as
Tocqueville observed, that in the United States, all parties are willing to recognize the rights
of the majority, because they all hope at some time to be able to exercise them to their own
advantage. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 264-80.
52. See I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 254-70 (explaining the view that in a
democracy the omnipotence of the majority poses the greatest threat to the people).
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established systems of representational government. Instead of voting
directly on issues, citizens voted to select individuals from amongst
themselves who would then be given specific, limited powers, through the
constitution, to act on behalf of the whole body of people they represent.!3
Our Federal Constitution, like the state constitutions before it,54 was
based on the principles of what has come to be known as "republican
democracy. 5  As previously noted, the people were very jealous of their
independence and they did not desire to come under the rule of a central
government.5w Nonetheless, they saw the necessity of joining the states
together for certain limited purposes. 57 The theory underlying the nation-
state relationship was that state officials derived their authority directly from
the people via the state constitutions. 8 That authority included the ability to
53. After describing the dangers that result from absolute majority rule, Tocqueville
went on to describe the solution:
If, on the other hand, a legislative power could be so constituted as to
represent the majority without necessarily being the slave of its passions, an
executive so as to retain a proper share of authority [independent of the
people], and a judiciary so as to remain independent of the other two powers,
a government would be formed which would still be democratic while
incurring scarcely any risk of tyranny.
I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 272.
54. Many features of the Federal Constitution were modeled after the earlier
constitutions of other states. See Holland, supra note 24, at 995; Williams, supra note 43, at
541. See generally TE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (drawing comparisons
between the United States Constitution and the state constitutions).
55. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government ... ."). Today when we refer to "republican
democracy, " it is generally understood that we are describing self-government by the people
through the election of representatives who are subject to constitutional controls. See In re
Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment
Session; Constitutionality Vel Non., 414 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1982) (distinguishing between
democracy and republican democracy). However, this understanding has not always been so
clear. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (discussing the many different
forms of government to which the term republic had been applied). It has been said about our
nation's founders that "'[o]nly one thing was certain, Americans believed that republicanism
meant an absence of an aristocracy and a monarchy. Beyond this, agreement vanished ....
Williams, supra note 43, at 550 (quoting Robert Shaihope, Toward a Republican Syntheses:
The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM.
& MARY Q. 49, 72 (1972)).
56. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
57. See WEBSTER, supra note 28, at 220 (discussing the limits imposed on the federal
government by the United States Constitution).
58. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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join together with other states to form a federation or confederation under
the banner of a single constitution.
59
However, the states could grant the federal government no greater
power than they received from their own people, and most of that power
could not be conveyed.60 Thus, the power of the federal government was
intended to be sharply limited to certain specific functions.6' A large portion
of the Federal Constitution is dedicated to defining and establishing
boundaries between the federal and state authorities, thereby limiting the
62federal government's authority to act in contradiction of state power.
C. The Development of Constitutional Law in Florida
63Florida is a comparative newcomer to statehood, and the drafters of
our first state constitution in 183864 undoubtedly relied heavily on the
59. The question of whether the federal government derived its authority directly from
the people or from the states for the benefit of the people has been a point of contention since
the early days of our republic. In M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404-05 (1819), the
United States Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he government of the Union ... is,
emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates
from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for
their benefit." Id. In response to that decision, a critic writing under the pseudonym
"Amphictyon" wrote: "The Constitution is not binding on any state, even the smallest,
without its own free and voluntary consent .... The respective states, then in their sovereign
capacity, did delegate the Federal Government its powers, and in so doing were parties to the
compact." SouRcEs AND DOCUMENTs ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788
AND THE FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 309 (Samuel E. Morrison ed., 2d ed
1965).
60. See infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of
nondelegation).
61. "The powers delegated... to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." THE FEDERALIST
No. 45 at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
62. See Holland, supra note 24, at 997. Many provisions of the Federal Constitution
were included specifically to insure the independence of the states, and of course, the entire
Bill of Rights was intended to limit the federal government's power over the people. Other
amendments further define the federal-state relationship. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. II.
63. Florida became a unified entity in 1822 when East Florida and West Florida were
combined into a single territory and did not become a state until 1845. See MORRIS, supra
note 2, at 325. The federal government had established specific requirements that had to be
met before a territory could be admitted to statehood, one of which was a requirement that the
territory have a constitution establishing a Republican form of government.
64. The 1838 Florida Constitution was adopted in 1839 by a margin of only 104 votes.
See CHARLTON W. TEBEAu, A HISTORY OF FLORIDA 126 (1971).
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constitutions of the states that preceded Florida in becoming a part of the
federal republic. More importantly, these early drafters relied on the same
66principles on which those predecessor constitutions were based . They also
relied, to a significant extent, on contemporary writings of the times about
the nature of constitutions and on the fundamental elements of republicanism
and democracy. 67 In addition, they relied to some degree on the Federal
Constitution.
Over the years, the Florida Constitution has been revised numerous
times. The first major revision occurred in 1861, when Florida seceded from
the Union. 9 In 1865, the state created a new post-war constitution that was
intended to help Florida gain readmission to the Union. However, owing to
65. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
66. See TEBEAU, supra note 64, at 126.
67. Some major works produced immediately prior to, or during, the framing of
Florida's first constitution included Tocqueville's Democracy in America, first published in
the United States in 1835. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1. Justice Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution was widely read and relied on by legal scholars, as was Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Law of England. The framers of the 1838 constitution were also
undoubtedly influenced by Jacksonian Democracy. This is evident both in the history of the
1838 convention and in the constitution itself. For example, the populists who swept Andrew
Jackson into the White House feared the banking industry and its influence on government.
See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in II MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 576-89 (Richardson ed., 1897) (explaining that in his opinion "the existing [Bank
of the United States] [was] unauthorized by the constitution, subversive of the rights of the
states, and dangerous to the liberties of the people"). After taking office, Jackson abolished
the central bank. See id. Historical accounts of Florida's 1838 constitutional convention
relate that the convention continued for three times as long as originally planned because the
delegates were deadlocked over banking provisions. See TEBEAU, supra note 64, at 128.
While its other provisions speak forcefully about freedom and liberty, the delegates gave the
Legislature extensive power to regulate banks and corporations and even went so far as to
forbid bankers from holding statewide office or serving in the Legislature. See Holland, supra
note 24, at 1000.
The state constitutions that were written during the presidency of Andrew
Jackson... were often interested in popular sovereignty. Thus, the state constitutions of that
time were often rights-conscious documents. Nearly all Jacksonian era state constitutions
added or expanded Declarations of Rights and.., placed them at the beginning of the
document [as was the case with Florida's constitution of 1838].
Id (citing James A. Henretta, Foreward: Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 819, 819-839 (1991)) (citations omitted).
68. The best evidence we have of direct reliance on the federal document is in the
constitutions themselves. Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Florida Constitution of 1838, for
example, are virtually identical to similar provisions in the Federal Constitution.
69. For a discussion of the 1861 Florida secession convention, see RALPH A. WOOSTER,
THE SECESSION CONVENTIONS OF THE SOUTH 6 (1962).
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the enactment of the Federal Reconstruction Acts70 and continued military
occupation, the 1865 constitution was never fully effective.7'
In 1867, the federal government compelled a state constitutional
convention. 72  Because of its compulsory nature and other circumstances
surrounding its enactment, the constitution produced by that convention-
the 1868 constitution-was never treated by the people of Florida as a
source of real authority.73 After the end of Reconstruction, the 1868
constitution was ultimately abandoned, and the 1885 constitution was
adopted to take its place.
74
70. See Reconstruction Acts, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428 (1867); ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867); ch.
30, 15 Stat. 14 (1867); ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41 (1868); ch. 3, 16 Stat. 59 (1868).
71. See TEBEAU, supra note 64, at 247 (noting that the federal military presence
continued in Florida after 1865).
72. The first Reconstruction Act divided the South into five military districts and placed
Florida, as well as the other secessionist states, under formal military rule. See Act of Mar. 2,
1867, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). Military rule did not cause dramatic changes in Florida,
since the state had been under military occupation since the end of the war anyway. The
second, or supplemental, Reconstruction Act established procedures for conducting state
conventions to establish new state constitutions that would satisfy certain requirements
established by the federal government in the Act. See WILLIAM WATSON DAVIS, THE CIVIL
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN FLORIDA 446-47 (1964).
73. The 1867 convention was in itself highly controversial. See Richard L. Hume,
Membership of the Florida Constitutional Convention of 1868: A Case Study of Republican
Factionalism in the Reconstruction South, 51 Fla. Hist. Q. (1972). There were serious doubts
about the credentials and authority of its participants. See DAVIS, supra note 72, at 491-516.
In addition to the fact that the state was still under military rule, the voting districts were
heavily gerrymandered to favor Republican candidates, and the referendum on the new
constitution appears to have been further marred by widespread voter fraud. See R.L. Peek,
Lawlessness and the Restoration of Order in Florida, 1868-1871, at 53-60 (1964)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida) (on file with the University of Florida).
One of the more extreme examples of the confusion that reigned in Florida during the years
after the adoption of the Constitution of 1867 culminated in Governor Reed being forced to
seek an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court of Florida to determine whether the
Legislature had been successful in impeaching and removing him from office. See DAVIS,
supra note 72, at 544-56. The court determined that Reed had not been removed from office,
in part, because four members of Legislature that were necessary to achieve a quorum had
accepted appointments to state office from Reed prior to the vote on his impeachment. Id.
Reed had declared their legislative seats vacant prior to the impeachment vote; thus, the
impeachment vote failed for lack of a quorum. Id. Before these issues were resolved,
however, Lieutenant Governor Gleason, with the cooperation of Secretary of State Alden, had
declared himself to be Governor. ld. Ultimately, Gleason was removed from office as the
result of an action in quo warranto filed by Reed; Secretary of State Alden was impeached.
Id.
74. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 8-9.
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Although frequently amended," the 1885 constitution continued in
force until it was replaced by the 1968 constitution. Florida's government
continues to operate under the authority of the 1968 constitution. As
previously noted, the 1968 constitution removed much extraneous political
material from the 1885 constitution, with the intent to improve the
constitution's ability to serve its basic purposes.76
As was the case with the constitution of 1838, the 1968 constitution is
a distinctly populist document that now includes five different methods of
amendment,8 and an explicit statement that all political power originates
with the people.79 It also contains an explicit separation of powers clause,0
sharp limits on the creation of laws by the legislative branch,8' some unique
82 8local government provisions, and a strong system of checks and balances.8 3Finally, it contains the written embodiment of certain rights its authors
75. For a general discussion of the amendments to the 1885 and 1968 constitutions, see
id. at 9-11. The complete text of each of the amendments to Florida's constitution, including
the Constitution of 1885, can be found at the World Wide Web cite of the Constitution
Revision Commission. See Revision Commission (visited July 7, 1997)
<http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/>.
76. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 13.
77. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing populist influences on the
Florida Constitution of 1838).
78. See FLA. CONST. art. XI. California has recently established a Constitution Revision
Commission by statute. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8275 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997). Florida,
meanwhile, is the only state that has an independent, constitutionally-established Constitution
Revision Commission. Florida also has a constitutionally established Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission, which has the power to make proposals relating to tax and budget
issues. In addition to these two commissions, Florida also allows amendment through citizen
initiative, legislative proposal, and constitutional convention. See FLA. CONST. art. XI.
79. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
80. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
81. Besides the usual majority vote and quorum requirements, the Florida Constitution
contains limitations on "special" and "local" legislation, id at art. III, § 11, as well as on
"appropriations bills." Id at art. III, §§ 12, 19. It also requires that bills be read three times,
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7, that the title of a bill describe its contents, id. at § 6, and that every
bill be limited to one subject. Id These types of provisions were commonly included in state
constitutions to limit the distribution of special privileges by the Legislature and to prevent
surreptitious legislative action. See Holland, supra note 24, at 1001.
82. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII.
83. See id at art. II, § 3; art. III, §§ 3(c)(1), 8, 16(c), (e), (f), 17. D'Alemberte attributes
our strong system of checks and balances to a conscious effort on the part of those who
created the 1885 constitution-from which many of the current constitution's checks and
balances are derived-to cure the governmental abuses that occurred during the
Reconstruction era. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 8-9.
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84considered inalienable. As will be discussed, it also contains other
significant provisions that limit governmental power over the people.
IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
Over the years, scholars and courts have employed a wide range of
methods for analyzing constitutions. Some principal methods include:
deriving the meaning of the constitution from the pure and literal meaning of
its text ("textualist"), 5 finding meaning in the intent of the framers
("originalist"), 86 and treating the constitution as a living document that must
be interpreted to conform to the immediate needs of modem society
("interpretivist"). 7 However, for the purposes of this article the constitution
84. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
85. The text of any constitution must, of course, be given great weight. Any analysis
should begin with the literal meaning of the constitution's text, and, where the text is
completely unambiguous, we should adhere to its plain language in determining what its
creators intended. See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 374 So. 2d 959 (Fla.
1979) (construing the Florida Constitution by applying the plain ordinary meaning of the
language it contains).
86. Where ambiguity exists, or where it has been injected by those who execute the laws
or by judicial decision, we should look for clarification in the origins of our constitution and
the reasoning of those who created it. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547
(1969) (relying heavily on the constitutional debates at the 1787 Philadelphia convention);
Bailey v. Ponce de Leon Port Auth., 398 So. 2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1981) (noting that in
construing state constitution courts must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers);
Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1978) (court must interpret state constitution in a
way that will best fulfill the intent of the framers).
87. An early example of the interpretivist philosophy can be seen in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in M'Culloch v. Maryland, in which John Marshall wrote that "a
constitution [is] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis
omitted). Thomas Jefferson responded to the decision in M'Culloch with the comment that
"the judiciary of the United States is the subtle core of sappers and miners constantly working
underground to undermine the foundations of our federal constitution." THE PORTABLE
JEFFERSON 994-95 (Peterson ed. 1975). Yet, allowing room for some interpretation may
reduce the extent to which we feel compelled to include large bodies of otherwise unnecessary
material in our constitutions. As Governor Coke of Texas once said: "It will be found
universally true that those State constitutions which contain the smallest number of provisions,
[and] which adhere most closely to fundamental declarations ... have been the wisest and
most enduring." John Walker Mauer, State Constitutions in a Time of Crisis: The Case of the
Texas Constitution of 1876, 68 TEX. L. REv 1615, 1634 (1990) (quoting S.J. 555, 14th Leg.,
Ist Sess. (Tex. 1874)). However, not every problem has an answer in the constitution, and it
should not be interpreted to provide answers to problems that are not constitutional in nature.
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is not being applied to a specific set of facts. Rather, under consideration is
whether the constitution's provisions are serving the purposes for which they
were intended.8
A constitution may properly be regarded as a document in which the
people set forth the structure of the government, including any powers they
wish to convey to the government from themselves, and including any
instructions they wish to include about how those powers are to be
distributed, retained, altered, or removed.8 9  It may also include an
enumeration of rights, but that is not strictly necessary because individual
rights are considered inherent in the individuals for whom the government
was created. 90 Given these factors, and the purpose of this article which is to
The answers to most legal problems-and to social problems that can be addressed by law-
can be found in the common and statutory law. See Holland, supra note 24, at 1000-01
(discussing that most of what we conceive to be rights can be found in the "common law").
See also Akhil Reed Amar, Forward: Lord Camden Meets Federalism-using State
Constitutions to Counter FederalAbuses, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 845, 849-58 (1996) (explaining by
hypothetical that violations of the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable
searches could often be more successfully redressed under the state trespass laws). But see
Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REv 215, 216-29 (1992)
(discussing the unfortunate extent to which state courts merely parrot federal judicial opinions
in applying state constitutions). Linde notes that "[o]nce the United States Supreme Court
used the label 'privacy' for claims of personal relationships and autonomy, any mention of
'privacy' in a state constitution became talismanic, regardless of its origins, context, or evident
purposes ..... Id. at 224 n.58. Where no answers can be found in the common or statutory
law, solutions can be created through the democratic processes authorized under the
constitution.
88. A constitution serves as the bedrock upon which the remainder of the positive law of
a particular jurisdiction (in this case Florida) is built. If restricted to appropriate constitutional
purposes, it should serve as one of the great forces for stability in the law and in society. To
the extent that a constitution strays from those purposes, the government and the people are
less well-served and their respective interests may be endangered. Of course, the difficulty
lies in agreeing upon the things that are "constitutional" in nature. For example, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida, Gerald Kogan, a member of the 1997-98 Constitution
Revision Commission, suggested that a ban on certain kinds of fishing nets does not belong in
the Florida Constitution. JOURNAL OF THE 1997-1998 CONSTITUTION REvISION COMMSSiON,
No. 2 (June 17, 1997). However, those who disagree with Justice Kogan correctly noted that
the citizens' initiative to ban fishing nets resulted from the Legislature's failure to pass a bill
directed to the issue. See, e.g., David Cox, Constitution panel hears net-ban debate, TAMPA
TRMUNE, July 23, 1997, at A19; Citizens Should Be Able To Petition For Change. How?,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, July 27, 1997, at B19.
89. See James M. Carson, The Constitution and the New Deal, Address Before the
Birmingham Forum (Dec. 16, 1935), for an excellent description of constitutions as charters
or contracts between citizens and government.
90. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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consider first "principles," the authors rely primarily on what can be fairly
described as a "functional analysis" of Florida's Constitution.
A. Protecting Against Tyranny: The Separation of Powers
"In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."9'
Tyranny arises most easily when all power is concentrated in the hands of a
single person or in the hands of just a few. A constitution that divides power
in numerous ways and in numerous directions will best serve the
constitutional function of protecting against tyranny. 92  Accordingly, the
Florida Constitution, the United States Constitution, and the constitutions
of the remaining forty-nine states divide government into three branches:
the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary.
Dividing government powers on paper, however, does no good, if the
divisions are not respected in practice. The federal government and the
states vary in the extent to which they allow one branch of government to
engage in the essential functions of another. About his vision for the federal
system, Madison commented:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
91. THE FEDERALISTNO. 51 at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
92. Tyranny can arise in other ways as well, such as from bureaucracy. Indeed, once a
bureaucratic tyranny has arised it may be more difficult to eliminate than a tyranny of any
other kind.
93. Morley stated:
It may be said that the federal form was historically ordained, by the fact that
the original thirteen colonies were separately established and had by the time
of the Revolution developed widely differing political and social customs.
Only a system which protected those diversities could combine these varying
units in a general unity. But behind the determination to keep the rights of
the several States inviolate was the even deeper determination to protect the
citizens of these states from centralized governmental oppression.
MORLEY, supra note 93, at 10.
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of the people. The different governments will control each other,
at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
94
Thus, the framers of the Federal Constitution intended to create a
system incorporating strong divisions of power. However, through judicial
acquiescence and the constant pressure the branches of government exert on
95 96each other95 those divisions have largely given way.
The Florida Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, contains an
explicit separation of powers requirement.97 The purpose of this provision
was to limit the extent to which any branch of government may perform
functions assigned by the constitution to another branch.98  Florida courts
have indicated that Florida's separation of powers requirement is stronger
than the federal requirement because it is explicit.
99
Under Florida's doctrine against encroachment, no branch of
government may encroach on the powers delegated to another branch by the
94. TiE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison, in using the term "departments" was referring here to the three branches of
government that exist in both the state and national governments. See id.; MORLEY, supra
note 91, at 232 n.1.
95. Constitutional republics are deliberately structured in a manner that results in some
friction between the branches. As James Madison noted: "Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition .... It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices [checks and
balances] should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?" THm FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). However, just as competitors in the private
sector sometimes enter into tacit agreements not to compete, the branches of government may
each sometimes quietly acquiese to encroachments on authority by the other two branches.
With regard to the federal-state relationship it has been noted that "vigorous state
constitutionalism is imperative because it perpetuates the scheme of dispersal of powers
envisioned by the framers." Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 421, 433 (1996). For the same reasons, it is equally
important to maintain the checks and balances that exist within a state's government. See
infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the valuable competitive elements of
constituitional government).
96. The United States Supreme Court has not entered a decision finding an unlawful
delegation of the lawmaking power since 1935. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
433 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935).
Indeed, the Court has only rarely upheld any separation of powers principle. But see,
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983).
97. See FLA. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
98. See, e.g., Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So. 2d 280, 284 (Fla. 1953).
99. See, e.g., Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978).
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constitution.100 For example, the Legislature cannot reserve to itself the right
to execute the laws it creates because the power to execute the laws is
reserved to the executive branch.10 1 Similarly, an officer of the executive
branch cannot engage in lawmaking-a function that, because of its supreme
nature, is reserved exclusively to the legislative branch'02 -adjudicate the
rights or claims of an individual, a function reserved to the judicial branch.103
A concordant policy, the doctrine of non-delegation, was intended to
prevent the Legislature from delegating its lawmaking power to either of the
other two branches of government. While it could, and should, be given
stronger effect, the courts have at least found that the doctrine forbids the
Legislature from delegating its core functions without any guidance or limits
as to how those functions are to be exercised. 1 4  The doctrine against
encroachment and the doctrine of non-delegation are valuable policies
derived from hundreds of years of wisdom. While these doctrines can
provide the people with a high level of protection against tyranny, the
division of powers is not as strong as it once was. We have not been careful
in guarding against a merger of the functions of government in the hands of a106
single branch. Accordingly, the Revision Commission should consider
100. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
101. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 82 ("[B]ecause it may be too great a temptation to
human frailty... for the same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in
their hands the power to execute them...
102. See FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 7.
103. See id at art. V, § 1.
104. See, e.g., Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
105. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 82 (asserting that "the legislative neither must nor can
transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people
have").
106. For example, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (The Administrative Procedures Act),
allows agencies of the executive branch to engage in lawmaking by establishing rules that
govern the behavior of businesses and individuals. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (Supp. 1996). After
creating their own rules, agencies execute the rules and even conduct adjudicatory
proceedings with regard to those who claim to be adversely affected by the agencies' actions.
Id. Thus, it is not atypical for a single individual-an agency head-to make laws, enforce the
same laws, and adjudicate rights under those laws. Id. Florida appellate courts have allowed
this melding of constitutional functions because the agencies rules and actions are subject to
review in the courts. However, when an aggrieved individual proceeds in the courts against
an agency's actions undertaken pursuant to Chapter 120, the agency's interpretations of both
rules and statutes, and its findings of fact are generally presumed to be correct. See, e.g.,
Ameristeel Corp. v. Clark, et. al., 691 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1997) (finding that a party challenging
an order of the Public Service Commission must overcome presumptions as to the
Commission's jurisdiction, reasonableness of the order, and deference owed to the agency's
interpretation of the statute it is charged with enforcing); Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa
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whether the separation of powers under the Florida Constitution, and its
related doctrines, can be strengthened.
B. The Legislative Branch
John Locke saw the establishment of legislative power as the first and
foremost of all positive laws. He called the law-making function the
"supreme power of the commonwealth"'0 7 because it is the responsibility of
the legislative branch to make laws that will govern all, including the
executive and the judiciary.! Accordingly, he believed that some sharp
controls on the legislative power were necessary.'0 9 The first of these
controls is, of course, the people themselves, who protect against the rise of
tyranny through their ability to remove legislators from office by the power
of their votes.110 A second control on the Legislature is the fact that the
lawmaking power is never concentrated in the hands of a single person or of
a small group of people. In Florida, the constitution divides the Legislature
between two separate houses-the House of Representatives, with one-
hundred and twenty members, and the Senate, with forty members.' Both
houses must agree, by a majority vote of its respective members, before a
law can be created, amended, or repealed."12  Still a third control on the
Legislature, suggested by Locke and applied successfully in Florida, is the
Political Comn., 625 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1993) (finding that the judgment of officials carrying
out the elections process shall be presumed to be correct and reasonable); Xerox Corp. v.
Blake, 415 So. 2d 1308, 1311 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), decision quashed by 447 So. 2d
1348 (Fla. 1984) (finding that tax assessment is presumed to be correct and any person
challenging an assessment must present proof which excludes every hypothesis of legal
assessment).
107. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 75. However, he also noted that in areas governed by
a legislative power that is not constantly in session, and in which the executive power is
vested in a single individual who also has a share of the legislative power, that person might
also be called "supreme." Id. at 85. Thus, under Locke's analysis, Florida retains supreme
power in its elected representatives only by preventing its Governor from exercising any
legislative power. This is perhaps why the framers of the Florida Constitution included an
explicit prohibition against delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. See supra
notes 101-08.
108. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 85-86.
109. See id. at 84-91.
110. See id at 84; see also FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 13.
111. The constitution requires that there be between 30 and 40 senatorial districts and
80 and 120 representative districts. See FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 16. The exact number of
districts is established by the Legislature, and as previously noted, there are currently 40
Senate Districts and 120 House Districts.
112. Id. at art. III, § 7. A two-thirds vote is required to override a law vetoed by the
Governor. Id. at § 8.
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part-time Legislature." 3 Locke correctly noted that there is not a constant
need for new laws. 114 Accordingly, it is best that legislators meet on a part-
time basis and then return home to live under the laws they have
created." 5 Finally, the Legislature is controlled by the executive veto
power.116 Any law created by the Florida Legislature is subject to veto by
the Governor.
Florida's Constitution also has a significant set of rules that the
Legislature must follow in creating laws, including restrictions on the kinds
of laws it can make.' The Florida Constitution may be considered superior
to some others, in part, because of these rules. For example, the "single
subject rules" 1 9 found in the Florida Constitution have caused our state to
develop a body of statutory law and an appropriations process that are far
more clear and well-reasoned than those produced under the Federal
Constitution. 120 The great significance of these seemingly modest provisions
lies in the fact that they are the only constraints, outside the Federal
Constitution,'12 on the Legislature's ability to make any laws it chooses. The
people can only be secure in granting the Legislature such broad power to
113. Id. at art. III, § 3.
114. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 86.
115. "Constant, frequent meetings of the legislative, and long continuations of their
assemblies without necessary occasion, could not but be burdensome to the people and must
necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniences ..... Id, at 88.
116. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8.
117. The ability to override the Governor's veto with a two-thirds vote of each house of
the Legislature establishes a constitutional control over the executive's veto power that
prevents the Governor from gaining control over the Legislature through its use. See id. at §
8(c).
118. Id. at art. III, § 11 (prohibiting certain special and local laws.).
119. Id. at art. III, § 6 (governing general acts of the Legislature and appropriations
bills, respectively).
120. The absence of similar rules in the United States Constitution leaves Congress free
to engage in "logrolling," a practice that involves combining unpopular legislation with
popular legislation to assure that the unpopular legislation will become law.
121. U.S. CONST. art. VI (supremacy clause).
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make laws, so long as there is a guiding foundation of moral law122 contained
in the constitution, to which all other law is subservient.
23
One would also hope that in making legislative decisions, the
Legislature would avoid creating laws that are sharply opposed to natural
human interests or behaviors. Anticipating Lyndon Johnson's selection of
the term "Great Society" to describe his unfortunate social agenda, Adam
Smith once said:
[Man] seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members
of the great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the
pieces upon a chessboard; he does not consider that the pieces
upon the chessboard have no other principle of motion than that
which the hand. impresses upon them; but that, in the great
chessboard of human society, every single piece has a principle of
motion of its own, altogether different from that which the
Legislature may wish to impress upon it. If those two principles
coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human society
will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy
and successful. If they are opposite or different, the game will go
122. As Justice Douglas said about rights, "the law must have a broad base in morality,
to protect man, his individuality and his conscience, against direct and indirect interference by
government." WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE (Alma Reese Candi ed.,
1958). Without moral foundation the law would be arbitrary, and over time it would not be
respected by those who are subjected to its power. Hence, without a moral basis for law, the
government would ultimately lose its ability to motivate the people except through coercive
means.
123. Murder, for example, is not wrong because it is illegal; it is illegal because it is
wrong. The law against murder has a moral foundation in the constitution which is established
for the benefit and protection of the lives, liberty, and property of those who live under it.
Tocqueville's discussion of this country's laws in 1831 reflects an understanding that a
society's laws can do little more than reflect the values of the people in that society. See
generally, I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 321-22. That linkage between the law and morality
persists in the public consienceness and is frequently reflected in public commentary. See,
e.g., CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS AcT 227 (1985). The authors quote the speech given by President
Lyndon Johnson upon signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in which he stated with regard
to racial injustice: "Our Constitution, the foundation of our Republic, forbids it. Morality
forbids it. And the law I will sign... forbids it." Commenting on the Civil Rights Act,
Johnson said: "Its purpose is to promote a more abiding commitment to freedom, a more
constant pursuit of justice, and a deeper respect for human dignity. We will achieve these
goals because most Americans are law-abiding citizens who want to do what is right."). Id. at
227-28.
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on miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest
degree of disorder.1
24
Where the law allows them to do so, bureaucrats and other authorities
will impose unreasonable expectations on an unwilling populace. 125 This is
one of the principle reasons why our foundational legal document should be
applied to limit the exercise of legislative power by executive branch
officials.
126
C. The Executive Branch
The executive branch is responsible for executing the laws the
legislative branch creates. 12  While there is, as Locke suggested, an area of
executive "prerogative" that arises from the Legislature's inability to foresee
all circumstances in which immediate action might be required, 128 the
executive risks being discredited whenever it acts without explicit legislative
authorization. Consequently, it is constrained to act only in those ways
unlikely to create public controversy.
129
In establishing the executive branch of government, the Florida
Constitution goes further than most other constitutions to protect the public
from tyranny by assigning certain duties and responsibilities to particular
officers and agencies of the government. 30 Unlike the constitutions of some
124. ADAM SMITH, THBE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENT 233-34 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Mafie eds., Oxford 1976) (1759).
125. See generally id.
126. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrines of
unlawful delegation and encroachment).
127. FLA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
128. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 92. Locke, however, contended that there might be some
instances in which the executive has the prerogative to act even against the law. See id. at 93-
94.
129. See id. at 94 (noting that prerogative is always largest in the hands of the wisest
and best princes, because it may always be quickly restrained if exercised against the public's
will).
130. See FLA. CONST. art. IV. One positive effect of these distributions of power is to
establish numerous opportunities for citizen input and numerous ways by which citizens can
redress their grievances. One arguably negative consequence is that there may be some
duplication of government services with an attendant duplication of expense and
inconvenience to those involved in the process. However, it is as true of the Florida
Constitution as it is of the United States Constitution that while it imposes burdens that may
seem "clumsy, inefficient, [and] even unworkable .... There is no support in the
Constitution ... for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in
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other states, the Florida Constitution does not vest all executive power in the
state's Governor. It establishes the Governor as the state's chief executive
officer,13 1 but then proceeds to divide the executive power among a wide
range of other executive officers and agencies.
132
Florida's Constitution is particularly unique in that it has an elected
Cabinet consisting of six officers. 133 Not unexpectedly, it has been a source
of vexation to many governors, including the current one, that the Office of
Governor must share its power with members of the cabinet who may be
political opponents.134  However, establishing some competition at the
complying with explicit constitutional standards may be avoided ...." INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
131. FLA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
132. Id. at §§ 4,6,9.
133. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(a). The offices of Secretary of State and
Treasurer/Comptroller were originally established in the Florida Constitution of 1838. FLA.
CONST. of 1838, art. III, §§ 14, 23. Like all of the state's justices and judges, these executive
branch officials were elected by a majority vote of both houses of the Legislature. See id. at
art. V, § 11 (providing for justices and judges to be elected by the state Legislature). Id. at art.
III, § 14 (establishing office of Secretary of State and providing for election by the
Legislature); id. at art. III, § 23 (creating and providing for election by the Legislature of a
"Treasurer and Comptroller of Public Accounts"). This first constitutionally authorized
Legislature was quite powerful in relation to the other two branches of government. In
addition to its power to make all judicial appointments, and the power to appoint key
executive branch officers, the Florida Constitution of 1838 vested sole authority to amend or
revise the constitution in the hands of the Legislature. Id at art. XIV, §§ 1, 2. While the
Governor was given veto power over legislation, the veto could be overridden by a simple
majority confirming the Legislature's will. FA CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 16.
The Constitution of 1868 provided for the Governor to appoint and be "assisted" by a
nine-member Cabinet of "administrative officers" consisting of a Secretary of State, Attorney
General, Comptroller, Treasurer, Surveyor General, Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Adjutant General, and Commissioner of Immigration. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 17.
However, this expansion of the Governor's powers lasted only briefly. The Legislature
amended the constitution in 1870 to once again provide for the popular election of Cabinet
officers. See Amendments to the Constitution of 1868, General Assembly of 1870 (Article III,
Cabinet Elections) (adopted February 12, 1870). Under the Constitution of 1868, the
Governor and Cabinet served on a "Board of Commissioners of State Institutions," which,
much like the modem Florida Cabinet, was assigned particular responsiblities by the
Legislature. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 20. The Constitution of 1885 reduced the number
of executive branch officers to seven, including the Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney
General, Comptroller, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Commissioner of
Agriculture, and continued to provide for them to be elected rather than appointed. FIA
CONST. of 1885, art. IV, § 20.
134. In the economic arena, it is commonly understood that competition drives down
prices and produces higher levels of value for consumers. The early framers of constitutional
government understood that in a divided government there would be competition among the
1997]
27
Webster and Bell: First Principles for Constitution Revision
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
highest levels of executive decision making sometimes causes an
extraordinary level of inquiry and public debate to surround thosedecisions. 135
In those areas of policy that require them to work with the cabinet,
Florida's governors are undoubtedly more restrained and less capricious in
making decisions.136  This provides some worthwhile protection for the
people. While some Cabinet reform may be appropriately considered by the
Revision Commission, 137 the elimination of the elected Cabinet would not
different divisions, and their comments reflect that understanding. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
No. 73 at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that in a divided
government, no branch of government "[must] be left to the mercy of the other."). Id. at 442.
Each branch "ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defense." Id.
Madison described the purpose of presidential veto power in similar competitive language
stating that "[tihe primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the executive
is to enable him to defend himself." THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
135. A recent example of the extent to which the Cabinet can focus public attention on
an issue involved a decision over whether to allow Florida Power and Light Company to burn
a controversial fuel called "Orimulsion" at one of its power generating facilities. Individuals,
environmental groups, and others offered testimony that consumed several days, generating
hundreds of press reports. See, e.g., Orimulsion Hearings Delayed Until Jan. 15, ST.
PETERSBURG TmiEs, October 22, 197, at F26; FPL Being Too Slick on Orimulsion Details,
PALM BEACH POST, October 17, 1997, at G27; Robert P. King, Tar Fuel's Next Stop:
Indiantown?, PALM BEACH POST, October 14, 1997, at E26; David Cox, Cabinet May Seek
Delay in Hearing on Orimulsion, TAMPA TRIB., October 10, 1997, at C26; Jeremy Wallace,
FPL Files Timeline for Fuel Hearing, BRADENTON HERALD, October 4, 1997, at D26; Jeremy
Wallace, Orimulsion Hearing Set, BRADENTON HERALD, October 4, 1997, at B26; Alan Judd,
FPL's Case on Fuel Sticky, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., June 15, 1997, at A26.
136. A common complaint about Florida's elected Cabinet is that the agencies placed
under Cabinet supervision lack accountability because they do not answer to a single
individual. However, the vast majority of the Cabinet's responsibilities were established by the
Legislature-not the constitution. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 20.24(1) (1995) (placing the
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles under the control of the Cabinet); id. at §
20.21(1) (1995) (placing the Florida Department of Revenue under the control of the
Cabinet); id. at § 20.201(1) (1995) (placing the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
under the control of the Cabinet). The Legislature is free to reassign the Cabinet's current
duties to the Governor, or to individual Cabinet officers, or to the extent that the Legislature
believes the agencies under the Cabinet lack accountability it can impose additional controls.
Thus, it does not appear that constitutional amendments are necessary to resolve this issue.
137. The Legislature has not always considered whether the functions it assigned to the
Cabinet were of an executive, legislative, or judicial nature. While it is within the executive
branch, the Cabinet now exercises some power associated with each of the three branches of
government. The Commission should consider alleviating this condition.
[Vol. 22:391
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/9
1997] Webster/Bell 419
serve any useful purpose. It would limit public debate and increase the
Governor's power at the expense of the people.
138
The division of executive and legislative branch power does not stop
with the cabinet. The Florida Constitution creates a multitude of
constitutional agencies, offices, and commissions. These offices and
agencies vary in the extent to which they are subject to the Governor's139
power and some agencies even have a measure of independence fromlegislative oversight.'4 These additional distributions of power were
138. The strength of the Office of Florida's Governor is commonly underestimated. The
office, as it is currently comprised, is really quite strong, both in comparison to the office as it
was comprised under earlier Florida constitutions, see supra note 133, and in comparison to
the Office of Governor as it is comprised in other states. With the adoption of legislative and
Cabinet term limits, see FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2, 4, the Governor's position vis-a-vis the
Legislature and the Cabinet has been strengthened. The Governor is the state's chief budget
officer and shares that power with no other state official. Morris, supra note 2, at 13. The
Governor's budget powers, and the ability to control programs, have been further expanded
through an amendment to the constitution that gives the executive line item veto power. FLA.
CONST. art. III § 8. And, while the Governor does not appoint Cabinet officers he or she does
appoint the member of over 438 state boards, and makes more than 4000 appointments during
his or her term of office. Morris, supra note 2 at 18-19. Moreover, history shows that a
Governor's greatest power is the opportunity as the state's chief executive officer to lead by
establishing values and standards - leading by moral suasion and example rather than by edict.
See id.
139. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a)(2) (15 of the 37 members of the Constitution
Revision Commission are appointed by the Governor. The Governor also designates the
chairman); id. at art. II, § 8(f) (providing for an independent Commission on Ethics); FLA.
STAT. § 112.321(1) (1995) (five of the nine members of the Commission on Ethics are
appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 9
(all five members of the Game and Freshwater Fish Commission are appointed by the
Governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate); id. at art. V, § 12(a)(3) (five of the 15
members of the Judicial Qualifications Commission are appointed by the Governor); id. at art.
V, § 11 (d) (providing for a judicial nominating commission to be established by general law);
FLA. STAT. § 43.29(1)(b) (1995) (three of the nine members of the judicial nominating
commission are appointed by the Governor); FLA. CONST. -art. IV, § 12 (providing that the
Legislature may establish a Department of Elderly Affairs); FLA. STAT. § 20.41(1) (1995) (the
head of the Department of Elderly Affairs is appointed by the Governor, subject to
confirmation by the Senate); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 11 (providing that the Legislature may
establish a Department of Veteran Affairs); FLA. STAT. § 20.37(1) (1995) (the head of the
Department of Veteran Affairs is the Governor and the Cabinet. The executive director of the
department is appointed by the Governor with the approval of three members of the Cabinet
and subject to confirmation by the Senate).
140. Constitutional commissions and agencies include the following: the Constitution
Revision Commission itself, FLA. CoNST. art. XI, § 2, the Taxation and Budget Reform
Commission, id. at art. XI, § 6; the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission, id. at art.
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intended to protect the people from tyranny. However, where any of these
offices is not subject to an adequate system of checks and balances, they can
become tyrannies within their area of authority. It may also be true that
some agencies and offices have outlived their usefulness. It would behoove
the Revision Commission to examine each of these agencies and offices
carefully to consider whether they are subject to adequate controls in the
form of checks and balances, whether they have continuing vitality, and
whether they serve a constitutional purpose.
4 2
D. The Judicial Branch
Even when ruled by a king, "[b]etwixt subject and subject . . . there
must be measures, laws, and judges . . . . The third branch of
government, the judiciary, which has been called the least dangerous
branch,144 was developed in society to substitute for two powers that people
had in nature. 45 The first is the power to do whatever one sees fit to assure
self preservation. 146 The second is the power to punish those who attempt to
IV, § 9; the Commission on Ethics, id. at art. II, § 8(f); the Judicial Nominating and
Qualifications Commissions, id. at art. V, §§ I l(d), 12(a); the Department of Elderly Affairs,
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 12; and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Id. at art. IV, § 11.
Constitutional officers include the following: Governor, id. at art. IV, § 1; Lieutenant
Governor, id. at art. IV, § 2; Cabinet officers, id at art. IV, § 4; the members of the
Legislature, FLA. CoNsT. art. III, § 1; the judiciary, id. at art. V, § 1; the clerks of the circuit
courts, id. at art. V, § 16; supervisor of elections, id. at art. VIII, § 1(d); state attorneys, id. at
art. V, § 17; and public defenders, FLA. CONST. art. V, § 18; property appraisers, id. at art.
VIII, § 1(d); constitutionally elected sheriffs, and tax collectors. Id. While they are not
constitutionally required under all circumstances, the constitution authorizes the creation of
county commissioners, id. at art. VIII, § 1(e), and all 67 counties have done so.
141. To employ a simple example, if property appraisers were given unlimited power to
appraise property without constitutional or statutory guidance, and without any controls by
other agencies, officers, or courts, they would have tyrannical power within the area of
authority given to them by the constitution. Even this modest power could be expanded to
great lengths if not subject to adequate checks and balances. While the authors use the Office
of Property Appraiser in this example, the authors do not intend to disparage property
appraisers, or suggest that this particular office should be abolished or altered. The authors'
purpose is to suggest that the Revision Commission examine constitutional offices to assure
that they are subject to adequate checks and balances.
142. Some agencies and officers could, perhaps, be as effective if they were created by
statute.
143. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 52.
144. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
145. See LocKE, supra note 25, at 72.
146. Id.
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infringe the right of self preservation. 47 Upon joining society, a person
gives up both of these rights, but in exchange receives the support of the
civil authorities to accomplish these matters on his behalf.14
In western society, these objectives are accomplished through the law
of torts, the criminal law, and the laws of free economy that allow parties to
apportion rights, duties, and privileges amongst themselves with the support
of the government. 49 If these remedies ceased to be available the people
would resort to self-help, as if in nature. Furthermore, since as Locke noted,
"[t]he great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their
properties in peace and safety. . . ."150 there would be no reason for people to
continue under the laws of a society if these interests were not protected.
151
Article V of the Florida Constitution establishes a system of courts and
judges consistent with the fundamental purpose of the judiciary by
establishing that all judicial officers of the state shall be "conservators of the
peace.""152 As Tocqueville explained:
The great end ofjustice is to substitute the notion of right or that of
violence .... The moral force which courts of justice possess
renders the use of physical force very rare and is frequently
substituted for it; but if force proves to be indispensable, its power
is doubled by its association with the idea of law.
153
Thus, the principal function of the judiciary is public and private dispute
resolution. 15 The courts have the power under article V to review the
constitutionality of legislative acts. But, like the other branches of
government, the courts are confined to the exercise of those powers assigned
to them under the constitution. The courts must take care that, in rendering
their opinions, they do not go beyond the Legislature's intent, thereby
147. Id Having given up the authority to protect their own interests through force,
individuals may now rely on the government to act on their behalf Id
148. See id
149. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 72-73.
150. Id. at 75.
151. See id
152. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 19.
153. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 145.
154. See generally id. (noting that the judiciary is an alternative to violent dispute
resolution).
155. See FLA. CONST. art. V (explicitly providing for the supreme court to review
decisions of the district and circuit courts affecting the constitutionality of statutes, thereby
implicitly establishing the power of "judicial review" in the lower courts). Id. at art. V, §
3(b)(3).
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creating new laws of their own156 Similarly, it is beyond the power of the
courts to execute the laws.
157
Florida's judicial officers have enormous independence. Appellate
judges, including the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida, do not stand
for popular election as do the officers of the executive and legislative
branches. 58 Instead, they are initially appointed and must stand for a merit
retention election every six years thereafter.159 If a majority of the electors
casting ballots do not vote for retention, the Governor must appoint a
replacement.160 The practical effect of merit retention elections has been to
give judges permanent tenure, subject only to the requirement that they retire
at age seventy.' 61 Because this is the case, some have expressed concern that
Florida's judges are too far removed from the public will. 162
Judes, like all other public officers, derive their power from the
people." ' If the judiciary is not subject to adequate checks and balances,
judges, like other public officers, can exert tyrannical power over the
people. 64 Unlike officers of the executive and legislative branches who are
directly responsible to a majority of the voters, judges should be free from
day-to-day political pressures. One of the principal functions of the courts is
to protect political minorities from "the tyranny of the majority."'165
156. See generally THE FEDERALISTNO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
157. See generally id. (noting that the judiciary is the least dangerous branch because
they have neither the power of the sword nor the purse).
158. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a).
159. See id.
160. See id. atart. V, § 11(a).
161. See id. at art. V, § 8. No Florida judge has ever failed to survive a merit retention
election.
162. The most striking expression of public concern over perceived judicial activism in
Florida occurred when voters amended article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution (search
and seizure) to eliminate what they perceived to be an overly-broad judicial interpretation of
the "exclusionary rule." See D'ALE~mERTE, supra note 7, at 28; see FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 12
(requiring that interpretations of the Florida Constitution conform to the opinions of the
United States Supreme Court). Proponents of the citizen initiative can point to that incident as
an example of the need to maintain the right of citizen initiative to insure that state officials do
not stray too far from the public will. See also supra note 7 and accompanying text
(discussing citizen initiatives as a means of overcoming legislative gridlock). Many
conservative analysts will find this an inappropriate delegation of state power to federal
authorities.
163. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
164. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 46, 47, 48 (James Madison) (suggesting that
when any branch is not limited by the system of checks and balances tyranny may result).
165. See MORLEY, supra note 93, at 27 ("'general government' must be given sufficient
power to safeguard 'the rights of the minority,' ... 'in all cases where a majority are united by
[Vol. 22:391
32
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/9
Webster/Bell
However, the judiciary should not be so far removed from public control that
judges can afford to consistently ignore the public will. Because of the
concerns that have arisen in this area, the Revision Commission should
consider whether the judiciary is subject to adequate checks and balances.
The Commission might also wish to consider whether it is appropriate to
maintain a mandatory retirement age for judges. 166  If adequate external
controls are lacking, then the Revision Commission should recommend
changes to the voters. When considering revisions that would affect the
judiciary, one point deserves consideration. It is clear that the Florida
Constitution contains some provisions that lend themselves to expansive
judicial interpretation. 167 Ourjudiciary would be more restrained if we had a
a common interest or passion') (quoting I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
134-35 (Max Ferland ed., Yale University Press (1937)). Tocqueville, who made many
accurate predictions about the future of our country, remarked that "it may be foreseen that
faith in public opinion will become for them a species of religion, and the majority its
ministering prophet." I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 11. In making this statement, he
foresaw the current era of political correctness, which in modem society is the greatest tyranny
that the people impose on themselves. Even in 1831, Tocqueville found that "[i]n the United
States the majority undertakes to supply a multitude of ready-made opinions for the use of
individuals, who are thus relieved from the necessity of forming opinions of their own." I
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 10. Based on his experiences in this country, he concluded:
When an opinion has taken root amongst a democratic people and established
itself in the minds of the bulk of the community, it afterwards persists by
itself and is maintained without effort, because no one attacks it. Those who
at first rejected it as false ultimately receive it as the general impression, and
those who still dispute it in their hearts conceal their dissent; they are careful
not to engage in a dangerous and useless conflict.
Id at 261. Tocqueville further explained:
Time, events, or the unaided individual action of the mind will sometimes
undermine or destroy an opinion, without any outward sign of the change. It
has not been openly assailed, no conspiracy has been formed to make war on
it, but its followers one by one noiselessly secede; day by day a few of them
abandon it, until at last it is only professed by a minority. In this state it will
still continue to prevail. As its enemies remain mute or only interchange their
thoughts by stealth, they are themselves unaware for a long period that a great
revolution has actually been effected; and in this state of uncertainty they take
no steps; they observe one another and are silent. The majority have ceased
to believe what they believed before, but they still affect to believe, and this
empty phantom of public opinion is strong enough to chill innovators and to
keep them silent and at a respectful distance.
Id at 261-62.
166. FLA. CoNsT. art V, § 8.
167. See discussion infra notes 234-238 and accompanying text
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more restrained constitution. Thus, the Revision Commission should
consider making changes that move the constitution in a direction more
conducive to judicial restraint.
E. Local Government
Just as there are some tasks of government that can best be
accomplished at a national or state level, there are also tasks that can most
beneficially be performed at the local level. 16  In considering revisions to
the Florida Constitution, the Revision Commission should consider whether
there are additional functions and responsibilities that can be delegated to
local governments.
Only a few thousand people voted on the adoption of Florida's first
constitution in 1838. The state's population was, of course, much less than
today. State government was much closer to the people and it represented
much less of an intrusion into citizens' daily lives.169  Indeed, in many
respects, the state government of 1838 was a local government. The change
in the nature of the relationship between individuals and state government
that has developed over the intervening years-simply through growth-
represents an enormous loss of value to the people. Democracy works best
in small units. A democracy composed of only six individuals is far more
likely to satisfy its constituents' concerns than a democracy of six
thousand. 0 Thus, it is appropriate that Florida has chosen to authorize the
transfer of a significant portion of the people's political power to counties
and municipalities through our state constitution. However, as previously
168. Accordingly, one of the "important thrusts" of the local government article of the
1968 Constitution was to expand local government power by removing the Legislature's
power to make local government decisions and turning that power over to local officials.
D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 123.
169. In 1831, Tocqueville noted:
N[othing] is more striking to a European traveler in the United States than the
absence of what we term the government, or the administration. Written laws
exist in America, and one sees the daily execution of them; but although
everything moves regularly, the mover can nowhere be discovered. The hand
that directs the social machine is invisible.
1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 72-73.
170. See I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 40. Tocqueville noted with some admiration
that in America "the township was organized before the county' the county before the state,
the state before the union." Id. at 42.
171. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 121-33 (discussing the prominent role of local
governments under the Florida Constitution). See also, MORLEY, supra note 91, at 5. It was
Morley's belief that "[t]he essence of federalism is reservation of control over local affairs to
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noted, the state has grown tremendously, and there has been a significant
consolidation of power at the state level. Many people have lost faith in
government simply because it seems so remote. Because of their relatively
smaller size and the smaller number of people they must serve, the units of
local government are better equipped to serve their constituents, in most
respects, than the state.
172
In examining the provisions of our constitution, the constitution
revision commission should generally avoid imposing any new limits on the
authority of our local institutions and should consider ways in which those
institutions can be strengthened. Where appropriate, the commission should
consider transferring power from the state to local authorities where it is
more easily controlled by the people themselves. This would help to restore
both the perception and the reality of the people's control over the
government they have created.
F. The Boundary Between State and National Government
Upon joining the Union, the State of Florida became a part of a
federalist system of government established more than 200 years ago. 173 Our
state constitution, together with its national counterpart, establishes a
separate sphere of influence for our state's laws as opposed to the laws of
the federal government. 174 Together, these two documents establish what is
properly understood as the "Federal Government."
When Tocqueville visited the United States in 1831, he found "twenty-
four small sovereign nations, whose agglomeration constitutes the body of
the Union.' 175 He described the relationship between the federal government
the localities themselves, the argument for which becomes stronger if the federation embraces
a large area, with strong climatic or cultural differences among the various states therein."
172. See I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 100. ("I [have] heard a thousand different
causes assigned for the evils of the state, but the local system was never mentioned among
them. I heard citizens attribute the power and prosperity of their country to a multitude of
reasons, but they all placed the advantages of local institutions in the foremost rank.").
173. See generally THE FEDERAST No. 39 (James Madison) (discussing the differences
between a national and a federal government). Federal governments consist of a joining
between the national government and the state governments. Id.
174. See generally Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts
andState Power, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1485, 1495 (1987). The courts have long ago concluded
that federal and state constitutions leave some areas in which both the federal and state
governments can act. However, this reasoning is contrary to the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution, which leaves no aspect of the power given by the
people to the government undistributed. U.S. CONsT. amends. IX-X.
175. I TOCQUEVLLE, supra note 1, at 61.
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and the states as "completely separate and almost independent."' 76  The
federal government being "circumscribed within certain limits and only
exercising an exceptional authority over the general interests of the
country." Conversely, "fulfilling the ordinary duties and responding to the
daily and indefinite calls of a community" fell to the states."'
The level of state independence Toequeville saw in this country soon
disappeared in the aftermath of the Civil War. The constitutional
relationship between the branches of government was formally altered by the
adoption of the post-Civil War amendments to the Federal Constitution.
79
However, the courts have subsequently agreed that in adopting those
amendments, the states did not intend to completely eliminate their separate
and independent nature. While the dividing lines between state and national
government have been blurred, we still have a strong federalist system of
government that continues to grow stronger.18 0  That system forms an
important part of the division of power that was intended to exist under the
original state and national constitutions. The Federal Constitution was
created not just to authorize the creation of a federal government, but for the
benefit and protection of the states as independent legal entities.' 8' It
contains numerous provisions protecting the states from federal
encroachment.1 2 There are also several constitutional doctrines that havedeveloped over the years to protect a separate sphere of influence for the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. ("The Federal government ... is the exception; the government of the states is
the rule.").
179. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
180. See generally Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution
Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 421 (1996) (discussing the continuing evolution of
federalist concepts).
181. See generally THE FEDERALISTNO. 37 (James Madison) (explaining that federalism
fosters stability for the federal government as well as the states).
182.
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at
all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and
these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The
people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallably make it
preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the
other as the instrument of redress.
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1494 (1987)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
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states, including the "Erie doctrine," 18 3 the "adequate state grounds
doctrine,",8 and the doctrine that allows the states to grant citizens greater
rights under state law than exist under federal law. 185 There is, and should
be, a constant tension over the proper boundary line between federal and
state authority. As with economic competition in the private sector, this
competitive aspect of our system of government is beneficial to the people
and, wherever it appears to be endangered, the Revision Commission should
consider whether steps can be taken to assure its preservation.
186
V. THE NATURE OF RIGHTS
In addition to providing an organizational framework that protects the
citizenry from governmental abuses, the Florida Constitution, like other
constitutions, establishes the relationship between government and the
people by enumerating certain rights. 1 7 These rights, as well as others, are
183. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (establishing that "Itihere
is no federal general common law" and thereby limiting the ability of federal courts to "create"
new law without a specific basis of authority such as state law, the United States Constitution,
or federal statutes).
184. The original formulation of the adequate state grounds doctrine provided that
where a state court entered a decision based on an "adequate state ground," such as a state
constitution or state statute, federal courts would not intervene to disturb the decision. Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945). While its use has slowed the past few years, in the early
1980s the United States Supreme Court turned this doctrine on its head and used it as a device
to assume jurisdiction over state court decisions based on state law. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983). Until the Court returns to its early formulation of the
doctrine it will be of no use in defining the boundary between federal and state governments.
185. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977).
186. See D'ALEAMBERTE, supra note 7, at 15 (discussing the 1968 Commission's concern
over federal intrusion on state authority).
187. See discussion supra note 25 and accompanying text. These rights are inherent in
the individual. Constitutions do not create rights in any classic sense. Explicit identification
of specific rights in constitutions is intended to assure that those rights will not be infringed.
Governments have provided for the enumeration of rights in their constitutions because
assurance of those rights is important to the continuation of democratic governments. As
Tocqueville noted, "[i]f ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event may be
attributed to the omnipotence of the majority, which may at some future time urge the
minorities to desperation and oblige them to have recourse to physical force." I TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 1, at 279. The minorities referred to here are, of course, political minorities. See
supra note 51.
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said to be retained by the people, and are required to be kept free from state
interference.18'
The scope of this article does not allow for a complete exploration of
every "right" that one might envision. As previously discussed, there are
certain fundamental rights that are inherent in all people.1i 9 However, the
term "right" has not been limited to its constitutional usage. It has often
been used interchangeably with the word "entitlement" to describe both
tangible and intangible goods and services to which individuals or groups
believe they have some legal claim.190  Accordingly, it is perhaps more
useful when considering revisions to the constitution to engage in a
discussion of the nature of rights and the significance of rights in our society.
John Locke asked the rhetorical question: "I[f man] in the state of
nature be so free ... [in] his own person and possessions ... why will he...
subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?" 19' Not
surprisingly, Locke also supplied the answer to his question and in that
answer we can perceive the boundaries of rights:
[I]n the state of nature he has such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is
very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others...
the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe,
very insecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition which,
however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not
without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society
with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call
by the general name 'property."192
As seen in Locke's statement, the concept of rights in society involves
something of a trade-off. While the members of a society continue to
possess all rights, they agree to accept limits on the exercise of certain rights,
188. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
189. See discussion supra note 25 and accompanying text.
190. A useful way of examining rights to determine if they are inherent is to consider
whether they can be lost. Truly inherent rights can never be lost. For example, the right of
free speech can be dishonored or ignored, but it still exists within the individual. An
expansive right to health care, at public expense, or public education would be a right that is
dependent upon the cooperation of others for its implementation. It is not inherent in the
individual and, unless enforced by the society, it ceases to exist. By interpreting the
constitution to include disguised wealth transfers, we impair its moral basis thereby weakening
the authority with which it speaks to other issues of a truly constitutional nature.
191. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 70.
192. Id. at 70-71.
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in exchange for the right to partake of and enhance certain others. As one
commentator has noted:
[S]ociety must have rules, and... those rules inevitably encroach
on personality. If the warden permits me to play solitaire in my
prison cell I am at liberty to cheat all I want; nobody else is
affected thereby. But if my freedom is somewhat enlarged, to
permit me to play bridge with three fellow-prisoners, I must
observe the rules of the game, arbitrary though they may seem to
me. For the freedom of a social game I have surrendered the
liberty I had at solitaire.
1 93
Outside of society, people have absolute freedom to do as they please.
Upon joining society they give up some portion of their freedom in exchange
for the ability to exercise particular rights to a greater extent than would be
possible outside society1 94  Tocqueville correctly noted that "[t]he
Revolution of the United States was the result of a mature and reflecting
preference for freedom, and not of a vague or ill-defined craving for
independence."' 195 It resulted from a "love of order and law."'196 If we seek
to understand the nature of rights we must first understand that the concept
of rights within society developed to facilitate the security of those who
sought to be governed. 97 While rights are individual in nature and society's
recognition of inherent rights will protect political minorities, a society will
not tolerate the exploitation of these rights for the purpose of avoiding
justice or engaging in extensive wealth transfers at the majority's expense. 99
193. MORLEY, supra note 91, at 37-38. The rights that individuals forego are not
extinguished but are transferred to the society in the form of powers to be exercised on the
individual's behalf. For example, the power to punish those who infringe our property rights.
194. See generally LOCKE, supra note 25.
195. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 73. See also MORLEY, supra note 90, at 34.
Morley was of the opinion that "[w]hat we really mean by individualism is the latitude of a
person to choose for himself among the many fruits of a civilization in which he actually
participates. It is not merely unfair but also impossible to cut oneself off from the
disagreeable results of collective action, while continuing to benefit substantially from those
regarded as pleasurable." Id.
196. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 73.
197. See MORLEY, supra note 91, at 27-28.
198. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURsE 14 (1991) (explaining that insistence on translating every interest into a right
"promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might
lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground").
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It is also commonly understood that:
Since people, in a competitive or any other society, are by no
means always just to each other, some regulation by the state ... is
unavoidable .... [But] the greatest injustice of all is done when
the umpire forgets that he too is bound by the rules, and begins to
make them as between contestants in behalf of his own
prejudices. 19
9
In addressing this concern, Locke described four restrictions on
governmental power that, in his view, arose from the proposition that all
governmental power was derived from the individuals who composed
society.200 The first restriction was that "[government] is not, nor can
possibly be, absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. 20'
Elsewhere, he described this restriction to mean that governments "are to
govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases,
but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the
countryman at plough. 20 2  This restriction on government has been
embodied in constitutional law under the broad heading of "equal protection
of the laws. 20 3
Next, Locke said that "these laws also ought to be designed for no other
end ultimately but the good of the people.",2  Locke was referring to the
necessity that laws be for the ultimate good of all people and not just for the
benefit of a select few. This restriction on governmental power is related to
the concept of equal protection of the laws and is also reflected in the so-
called "public purpose doctrine."
205
199. MORLEY, supra note 91, at 13.
200. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 76-82. Under Locke's approach, government can
receive no greater power than it is given by the people, and there are moral limits on the
exercise of those powers. Accordingly, government power is subject to the same moral
restrictions that existed in individuals before they joined in a society. See id.
201. Id. at76.
202. Id. at 81.
203. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
204. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 81. Elsewhere Locke noted that "a rational creature
cannot be supposed, when free, to put himself into subjection to another of his own harm ..."
Id. at 93. Thus, it must be assumed that all laws should be created for the benefit of those to
be governed.
205. See FLA. CoNST art. VII, § 10(c); Linscott v. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth.,
443 So. 2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1983).
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Locke went on to explain that "the supreme power [the Legislature]
cannot take from any man part of his property without his own consent."
20
This restriction is embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Florida
Constitution. 207  Locke further explained that this includes efforts by a
government to "raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent
of the people... 208
Finally, Locke said "the Legislature neither must nor can transfer the
power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the
people have. '2 - As discussed above, this restriction is embodied in the
separation of powers requirement under the Florida Constitution. 0
A. The Right to Equal Protection of the Laws
Because it is so significant to the exercise of all rights in society, the
right to equal protection of the laws deserves some special attention. Every
Floridian has an inherent right to equal protection of the laws of this state.
21
As noted above, this right arises from the fact that the individual
relinquishes a certain amount of freedom in order to secure the rights society
212has to offer. However, there is no right of equality of outcomes. Anatole
France once mockingly said that "[t]he law, in its majestic equality, forbids
the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and
to steal bread. ' 213 While this comment is both harsh and humorous, it is also
true. The Florida Constitution does not attempt to cure all of the injustices
206. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 79.
207. See FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 9; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
208. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 81.
209. l at 82.
210. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
211. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (enumerating the inherent right to equal protection of
the laws). The question of when a right is fundamental, such that it falls within the scope of
the theory of inherent rights, can normally be determined by ascertaining the answer to one
simple question: Can the right be exercised without the aid of the government or others?
Sometimes the answer to this question can be ascertained by determining whether some wealth
transfer is necessary to enforce the supposed right. If a right can only be secured through the
government's coercion of others, then it is not an inherent right and is not, in any classic
sense, a fundamental right.
212. Many rights are either not naturally available to isolated individuals, or would have
no meaning to an isolated individual. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, AM. ECON. REV. 347-57 (1967). It was that author's view that "In the world
of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role. Property rights are an instrument of society
and derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations that he
can reasonably hold in his dealings with others." Id. at 347
213. THoMAs SOWELL, A CoNFLIcr OF VISIONS 88 (1987).
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and hardships of life, to do so would be beyond the power of any
constitution.
214
The right of equal protection of the laws forbids the government from
treating those things that are similarly situated as though they are different,
but it does not require the government to treat those things which are in fact
215different as though they are the same.As Locke said:
Though... all men by nature are equal .... [a]ge or virtue may
give men a just precedence; excellence of parts and merit may
place others above the common level; birth may subject some, and
alliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to those whom
nature, gratitude, or other respects may have made it due; and yet
all this consists with the equality which all men are in, in respect of
jurisdiction or dominion one over another, which was the equality I
there spoke of as proper to the business in hand, being that equal
right that every man has to his natural freedom, without being
• 216
subjected to the will or authority of any other man.
Recently, there has been a strong trend in our society to extend the
constitutional 17 theory of equal protection of the laws to require equality of
218
outcomes for particular groups or arbitrary classifications of people. All
214. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (explaining that even the United
States Constitution cannot "provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill").
215. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(construing the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution).
216. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 31.
217. It is important at this point to note the difference between constitutional rights and
legislatively created rights. Subject to the limits imposed by the constitution, the Legislature
is free to create statutory economic rights. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.01-.60 (creating the
right to receive workers' compensation under certain statutorily prescribed circumstances).
218. Often these efforts are accompanied by demands for government spending or
increases in taxation for the purpose of making various kinds of economic opportunities
available to groups of people who are believed to be disadvantaged. See, e.g., Allen W.
Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
1325 (1992); Mary Ellen Cusack, Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a
Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 173 (1993); Bert B. Lockwood Jr. et. al.,
Litigating State Constitutional Rights to Happiness and Safety: A Strategy for Ensuring the
Provision of Basic Needs to the Poor, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1 (1993). These efforts are
misplaced. As Locke noted, "[t]he great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into
commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their
property." LOCKE, supra note 25, at 71. Government does not normally produce wealth; it
obtains wealth through the taxation of its citizens. Establishing economic rights in certain
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rights of a constitutional nature are vested in individuals, not in groups.
When we attempt to confer preferences upon groups as opposed to
individuals we move in direct violation of the principle of equal
protection.1
9
A simple demonstration of this idea is that all citizens have an inherent
right to petition the government for redress of grievances. This right arises
based upon the individual's relationship with the government; 22 it does not
arise by virtue of membership in any particular group.22 1 Conf'ing the right
to redress grievances to members of particular groups, or granting some
groups a more expansive right, would deprive all others of the equal benefit
of that right. Thus, it is not only contrary to the notion of "individual"
liberties to find that rights arise from groups, but doing so directly violates
the principle of equal protection of the laws.
We may not all agree on which rights are constitutional in nature. But,
we can all agree on a core of rights that belong in the constitution, and we
must recognize that grossly expanding these rights into controversial areas
can cause even core rights to be called into question.222  This is not to
suggest that Legislatures are forbidden from conferring benefits,223 it simply
means that government is not compelled to do so as a matter of
constitutional law.
individuals necessarily implies a need to take money from some other individuals to meet the
demand imposed by the new economic right. In doing so, government risks impairing its
relationship with those from whom it removes wealth for the benefit of others.
219. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
220. U.S. CONST. art. I; FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
221. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, TnE IPOVEiuSHMENT OF PoLrncAL
DiscouRsE (1991) (explaining that "[a]n intemperate rhetoric of personal liberty in this way
corrodes the social foundations on which individual freedom and security ultimately rest").
222. Others have noted that interpreting rights too expansively can cause them to be so
disrespected that they are destroyed. See, e.g., Gerald B. Cope Jr., Toward a Right of Privacy
as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 633, 664 n.182 (1977) (citing
Kurland, The Private!, U. CHi. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 11).
223. See discussion supra pp. 29-33. Equal protection of the laws requires that persons
who are similarly situated be treated as though they are the same. Thus, if government
chooses to confer benefits on individuals for arbitrary reasons it would run afoul of the equal
protection requirement. Government can confer benefits, but it must comply with the law in
doing so.
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B. Rights in Property
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that property should not
normally be acquired by individuals from government. Additionally, the
rights properly considered constitutional are those that caused us to join into
society, and without which we would not have willingly joined the society at
all. These rights can be summarized as those necessary to enjoy life, liberty,
and property within the bounds of a civilized society.225 Locke considered
all such rights under the notion of property, and described the circumstances
226
under which primitive property rights evolved from common ownership.
He believed "acquisition and improvement" created a right of individual
ownership.227 One of the incidents of ownership is, of course, the power to
convey an ownership interest to others, so property rights could be
continued. 8 Natural limits to property rights existed in the form of limits
on the amount of property a person could put to a useful purpose, without
waste.229
The obvious limit to Locke's theory, the one he left unexplored, is the
lack of sufficient property available for "acquisition and
improvement., 230 This may cause market-based societies to appear
unfair. However, free markets are constantly devising new forms of
property,231 new ways of executing transactions in property,232 and new ways
of taking ownership in property.233  Thus, the problem Locke left
unexplored, the potentially limited supply of property, seems to be
constantly in the process of being overcome.
224. Government was not intended to be, and is normally not a wealth producer.
Accordingly, the wealth it transfers to one must usually be obtained from others.
225. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
226. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 16-30.
227. Id. at 18-19.
228. Id. at 28.
229. Id. at 19.
230. Id. at 16-30.
231. For example, we now recognize a wide range of intellectual property.
232. Much like their peasant forebears who gleaned fallen grain from the fields of land
owners, arbitrageurs now sit at computer terminals and "glean" small fractional profits by
exploiting the differences in the price of stocks between the stock exchanges. Some have
grown quite wealthy through this modem day gleaning process.
233. In modem times, we have developed stock markets in which anyone can buy an
interest in a publicly traded company. The right to purchase or sell stocks at a future date is
also a valuable property interest ("futures") that can be freely traded, and one can even
purchase futures in the currency used to purchase stocks or other commodities ("currency
futures").
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VI. OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
The Florida Constitution contains a body of non-fundamental legal
material. Much of this material was incorporated at various times for
234political reasons. While most of these provisions taken individually are
quite harmless, the overall importance of the constitution is diminished in
the minds of the public and lawmakers when legal material of lesser
significance is included in its pages. To the extent that these provisions are
innocuous, there is no real reason to remove them from the constitution other
than as a kind of housekeeping exercise. However, some provisions that are
purely gratuitous have the potential to be misinterpreted and should be
considered for removal.235 For example, article IX, section 1, establishes the
requirement that "[a]dequate provision shall be made . . . for the
establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions of higher learning
,236and other public education programs .. .. " This provision is particularlytroubling because as Tocqueville said:
It cannot be doubted that in the United States the instruction of the
people powerfully contributes to the support of the democratic
republic; and such must always be the case, I believe, where the
instruction which enlightens the understanding is not separated
from the moral education which amends the heart.
23 7
However, some interpret article IX, section 1 to require a particular
level of school funding and would use it as a basis for allowing individuals
to sue the state for additional educational funding.238 If thejudiciary were to
expand on this simple statement, it could be used as a basis for requiring
234. D'ALEmERTE, supra note 7, at 16 (describing some constitutional language as
"meaningless" but "politically popular").
235. Id at 17 (noting that some provisions of the Constitution of 1968 were merely
"statements of asprirations"or were "precatory" in nature).
236. FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
237. I TOcQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 329.
238. One attempt to secure an expansive interpretation of this language was a partial
failure. See Coalition For Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d
400 (Fla. 1996). However, because the court left the door open to future challenges, the suit
secured a measure of success for those who wish to compel a higher level of school
funding. See also Barbara J. Staros, School Finance Litigation in Florida: A Historical
Analysis, 23 STETSON L. REv. 497 (1994); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New
Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995); John Powell,
Segregation and Educational Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public Schools, 17 HALINE J. PUB.
L. & POL'Y 337 (1996).
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wealth transfers for the benefit of particular individuals or groups.
Therefore, its continued inclusion in the Florida Constitution offers little
value in exchange for the associated risk.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the most part, the Florida Constitution has served us well and
should not be changed. In considering whether specific constitutional
revisions should be adopted, we should ask ourselves the following
questions: What is the appropriate relationship between government and the
people, and is that relationship properly reflected in the social order that has
developed under the constitution? If not, can the problems we find in the
social order be addressed through the constitution? Are they fundamental in
nature, or should they be addressed through some other means?
With regard to each of the three branches of government, as well as
each officer and agency, we should ask if the system of checks and balances
in the constitution is well-ordered, and whether the divisions of power are
being respected. As a practical matter, we should ask whether the
government is functioning well, or whether the people would benefit from
some reorganization that must be accomplished through constitutional
means.
In answering these questions, the text of the document as well as the
purpose and ideas of the people who created the constitution should be
honored. It was once said that "[t]he peogle reign in the American political
world as the Deity does in the universe." 9 This statement was intended to
mean that, collectively, the people exercise complete control over their
government. If the Revision Commission accomplishes nothing else, we
hope that it will take some small steps towards restoring the truth of that
statement for the people of Florida.
239. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 60. Tocqueville further comments that, "[i]n
America, the people form a master who must be obeyed to the utmost limits of possibility."
Id. at 64.
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